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Preface
The following is the text of a talk I gave at the 2006 National Conference on Undergraduate Research. It outlines the salient results of research which I began in 2005 in preparation from my undergraduate thesis. These results aim at a theoretical analysis of certain monastic 
deployments of silence and their relevance to socio-epistemological problems 
identified by certain contemporary social theorists. 
Introduction
Eight Quotations:
Everywhere the masses are encouraged to speak, they are urged to live socially, 
electorally, sexually, in participation, in festival, in free speech…The spectre must 
be exorcised, it must pronounce its name. Nothing shows more dramatically 
that the only genuine problem today is the silence of the mass, the silence of the 
silent majority (Baudrilard 1983, 23).
Who sits in solitude and is quiet hath escaped from three wars: hearing, speaking, 
and seeing (Waddell).  
But this silence is paradoxical—it isn’t a silence which does not speak, it is a 
silence which refuses to be spoken for in its name. And in this sense, far from 
being a form of alienation, it is an absolute weapon (Baudrillard 1982 21-2).
I have endowed him with my spirit that he may bring justice to the nations. He 
does not cry out aloud, or make his voice heard in the streets (Isaiah 42:2).
Should we initiated an information dietetics? Should we thin out the obese, the 
obese systems, and create institutions to uninform? (Baudrillard 2001)
Go and sit in thy cell, and thy cell shall teach thee all things. (Waddell).
…Now, in fact, the masses have no history to write, neither past, nor future, 
they have no virtual energies to release, nor any desire to fulfill; their strength 
is actual, in the present, and sufficient unto itself. It consists in their silence, in 
their capacity to absorb and neutralize, already superior to any power acting on 
them… (Baudrillard 2001, 2).   
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From the beginning I have been silent. I have kept quiet, kept 
myself in check. I groan like a woman in labor. I suffocate, I stifle 
(Isaiah 42:14).  
The preceeding words were those of theorist Jean Baudrillard, 
the Christian desert monastics, and, finally, Yahweh himself. 
Taken together they create a dialogue about the strategic 
power of deployment and retention, discursive practice and 
intuitive reticence, the a/historical capacities of speech and of 
its refusal. These concerns can be summarized in terms of two 
questions: What are the powers silence? And why should they be 
exercised?
 For the past year I have been writing a thesis which addresses 
these questions in two parts. In the first part I posit a socio-
epsitemological problem: The ultra-proliferation of information 
accompanying the global economy has constituted the sublation 
or displacement of conventional forms of meaning in the West. 
The second part analyzes a system of physical, epistemological, 
theological, and philosophical structures which has theorized 
and deployed silence as a meta-sign for counter-culutral practice. 
This is the Catholic tradition of Cistercian Monasticism. The rest 
of this brief talk will be aimed at giving you a sense of how each 
main part of my thesis addresses my two intial questions.
I.  And why should they be exercised?
The input/output of electronic media has replaced physical 
production as the driving force behind political, economic, and 
interpersonal life; thus “information age” becomes a platitutide. 
What is not widely acknowledged is that this shift in cultural 
geography constitutes a violent reconfiguration of human 
epistemologies. Our idea of “knowledge” and how to access it is 
inextricably linked to the possibilities we have for representing, 
viewing, and cognizing word and image. As McLuhan noted: 
…After three thousand years of exploration, by means of 
fragmentary and mechanical technology, the Western world 
is imploding…[electronic technology] is reshaping and 
restructuring patterns of social interdependence and every 
aspect of our personal lives…Whether the extension of our 
consciousness, so long sought by the advertisers for specific 
products, will be “a good thing” is a question which admits of 
a wide solution. (McLuhan 3)
McLuhan’s anxiety about the ultimate social effects of this shift 
has been born by out by the present condition of conventional 
channels of meaning and by the irruption in the kinds of sources 
by which meaning is thought to originate. Let us consider this 
irruption of epistemic venues in terms of two conventionally 
Western meaning-structures: social discourse, natural science, 
and ontology. 
The Social
Since the immediate aftermath of Gutenberg and continuing 
until the late 20th century the Western model of social 
discourse has been characterized by the propositional nature of 
speech and text and by the quantitative limits which analogue 
mediums imposed on them. In other words, social discourse 
was thought most appropriate when it took the form of rational 
argumentation expressed within the structural limitations of 
speeches, newspapers, and books. Neil Postman writes: 
To engage the written word means to follow a line of thought, 
which requires considerable powers of classifying, inference-
making and reasoning… It also means to weigh ideas, to compare 
and contrast assertions, to connect one generalization to another. 
(Postman 51)
Conventional Western understandings of the nature of meaning 
are related to both this notion of propositional interconnectedness 
and to the quantitative limitation of information through 
analogue formats. Meaning is concerned with integrating 
diverse informational fragments in such a way as to construct an 
intelligble, purposive reality. For this to occur it is necessary that 
information be manageable in terms of its context, quantity, and 
cognizability.
Speech and text, however, are no longer primary in the sphere of 
the social. Rather, the perpetual flicker of the image has become 
the model both of social “knowledge” itself and of the appropriate 
avenues of its exchange. This is to be seen in clearly documented 
phenomena such the hegemony of television in domestic life, 
the decline of the newspaper, the 24 hour news feed and its 30 
second sound bites (Stephen 10). The problem here is twofold. 
Firstly, image-based media do not structurally allow for the kind 
of propositional argumentation which has historically consituted 
the social; the graphics of the poll  replace the op. ed. letter as the 
voice-space of the masses. Secondly, the speed of the digital has 
proliferated information to such a staggering degree that it casts 
the process of coherently integrating informational fragments 
into a space of improbability and pastiche. Or, as Baudrillard 
puts it, this new epistemological currency constitutes “…..a 
liquidation of all referentials…a material more malleable than 
meaning in that it lends itself to all systems of equivalences, to 
all binary oppositions, to all combinatory algebras” (Baudrillard 
1994, 2).  
The Scope of Nature
Earlier I spoke of the onset of the digital economy as consituting 
a shift in cultural geography. In in a sense, it is a shift in physical 
geography—or at least in the relation between physical space and 
our “knowledge” of the natural world. The speed and ubiquity of 
the digital constructs a world of perpetual presence which is at 
the same time ontologically displaced by its fundamental status 
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as presentation or projection of  electronic media. Paul Virilio 
describes this situation in terms of optical perception:
This is an active (wave) optics, replacing in a thoroughgoing 
way the passive (geometric) optics of the era of Galileo’s 
spy-glass. Anddoing so as though the loss of the horizon-
line of geographical perspective…necessitated…a substitute 
horizon: the “artificial horizon” of a screen or monitor, 
capable of permanently displaying the new preponderance 
of media perspective over the immediate perspective of 
space. (Virilio 14)
This imposition of a new perpceptual horizon—a new, total 
“place-ness” of media—carries our discussion from the 
epistemological to the ontological. What is it to be in a world 
delimited by virtual space, by the tele-present?
Simulation
For Baudrillard the answer is that  meaning-structures such as 
ontology no longer have anything to signify--nor do they signify 
nothing. Rather, they operate as simulations: virtual signs which 
neither point to a reality nor deny a truth. Rather, they obviate the 
difference between affirmation and denial. Baudrillard writes:
Something has disappeared: the sovereign difference, between 
one and the other, that constituted the charm of abstraction. 
Because it is difference that constitutes the poetry of the map 
and the charm of the territory, the magic of the concept and the 
charm of the real. The imaginary of representation…disappears 
in the simulation whose operation is nuclear and genetic, no 
longer at all specular or discursive. It is all of metaphysics that is 
lost…(Baudrillard 1994, 2)
Meaning is an anachronism….
Or is it? Despite his avowed nihilism, Baudrillard does offer 
glimpses of strategies which might oppose the simulacrum of 
information-culture. Virtually all of these glimpses focus on 
tecnhniques of absence, reduction, negation, and silence. In 
Fatal Strategies Baudrillard poses a question which I quoted 
earlier.  “Should we initiate an information dietics? Should we 
thin out the obese, the obese systems, and create institutions 
to uninform?” (Baudrillard 2001, 193) In a manner of speaking, 
the rest of this paper is about an institution to uniform. Really, 
it is about a way of thinking and living which uses silence as 
constructive strategy and a deconstructive weapon in order to 
preserve a model of meaning in the reality of its practioners.
II. What are the powers of silence? 
The monastic order of Cistercians was founded at very end of 
the 11th century by french Benedictines looking for a simpler 
and more rigorous observation of the Benedictine rule. This 
included a strict observance of silence which became a central 
concept as the Cistercians theorized their practice in opposition 
to succeeding worldy cultures. In order to get a sense of what this 
practice has entailed I invite you to consider  one aspect of the 
Cistercian strategy: 
Silence and The Binary
Echoing the impossible unity of a tripartite God, Cistercian 
thought does not see silence as functioning through dialectical 
opposition; silence is not opposed to language, effacement 
to support, destruction to stability. Rather, these events are 
constituted by the same act of sublimation. The author of a 
monastic training book writes:
They had adopted the famous maxim of St. Arsenius: Fuge, 
tace, quiesce; fly from everything that diverts you from God, 
observer an interior and exterior silence that so you may be 
enabled to hear the voice of God, allay all agitation of mind 
and heart in order to enjoy repose in God (SD 36).
This stands in contrast to the conventional Western understanding 
of legitimate conceptual reasoning. Following Aristotle’s law of 
non-contradiction, Westerners generally understand meaning 
in binary terms: true/false, action/inaction, speech/silence. 
Historically, capitalist ethics and Enlightenment heritage work 
together, providing their own mythology of meaning; it’s motto: 
“paucity of meaning must be countered with informational 
maximalization. Or, in binary terms: information/enlightenment/
meaning // silence/darkness/meaninglessness. 
Following the model of the crucifixion—the ultimate silencing 
which becomes the final redemption, Cistercian theory rejects 
meaning as a binary modality. 
Silence as Epistemology
This rejection is closely linked to the Cistercian understanding 
of silence as an alternative espistemological space which moves 
between rationality and intuition. Silence becomes a mode of 
discernment or listening which by its very emptiness deconstructs 
information and provides an extra-rational context in which 
specific kinds of meaning emerge. Thus we read the opening line 
of the Bendectine Rule: “ Listen my son, and with your heart hear 
the principles of your Master” (RB Prologue). It is significant that, 
from antiquity to the medieval period, the conceptual “heart” 
was seen as the bodies’ epistemological space, circumscribing 
intellectual and spiritual activity. Also related to the idea of 
“discernment” or listening is the notion of God as the Word. Like 
ordinary language the Word is something which allows for and 
even demands understanding and exchange. Unlike ordinary 
language the Word requires a special mode of relation, the extra-
rationality of engaged silence. For this reason Cistercian daily life 
is structured as  rigorously staged performance of choreographed 
speech, silence, and text.
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Conclusion
Perhaps what Cistercianism recommends to the laymen or 
secular is a perversely meaningful version of what Baudrillard 
calls “the strategy of the object” (Baudrillard  2001 85). This is 
the strategy of non-resistance, inertia, and refusal to respond. 
Note that in this strategy one acts paradoxically by renouncng 
subjectivity in order to achieve desired ends. Conversely, on this 
model (which is entirely consonant with Cistercian practice) it is 
the active acceptance of subjectivity which deters one from the 
strategic goal.
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I hope that by now it is clear why I began with the quotations I 
did. Discourses as diverse as Catholic theology and postmodern 
theory—discourses which deny each other’s foundational claims—
often have much to say to each other in light of a particular 
problematic. I hope that, as limited this talk has been, you have. 
some intimations of why we are “urged to live socially, electorally, 
sexually, to pronounce [our] name,” why Isaiah’s bringer of justice 
“does not cry aloud or make his name heard in the streets,” why 
Yahweh has kept quiet, kept himself in check, how silence can be 
“an absolute weapon.”
